Imperative Theory of the State by Schwartz, Bernard
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 3 Article 2
5-1-1950
Imperative Theory of the State
Bernard Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernard Schwartz, Imperative Theory of the State, 25 Notre Dame L. Rev. 438 (1950).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol25/iss3/2
THE IMPERATIVE THEORY OF THE STATE
Leviathan, of which Thomas Hobbes wrote some three
hundred years ago, has come to life in our own day. The
Puritan Rebellion led Hobbes to seek for a formula of social
peace. The result of that search was his theory of the State
-a theory of an omnicompetent, despotic State, a State
which is subject to no law and can do no wrong. Allowing
for changes in terminology, we have in Hobbes, in its bald-
est form, the theory of what we have come to call the auth-
oritarian State--the Power State, uncontrolled by law, in the
Anglo-American sense. It is in this respect that Leviathan
has become a reality today.
The appearance of the authoritarian State has naturally
led to changes in juristic and political theories of the State.
Such theories of necessity reflect variations in the external
world of which they are but a mirror. As Laski has stated:'
No Staatslehre is ever intelligible save in the context of
its time. What men think about the state is always the out-
come of the experience in which they are immersed. The
Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day produces Whiggism
in the author of the Vindiciae; the Puritan Rebellion sets
Hobbes searching for the formula of social peace; the "Glor-
ious Revolution" of 1688 enables Locke to affirm that the
power of the Crown is built upon the consent of its subjects.
Rousseau, Hegel, T. H. Green, all sought to give the mental
climate of their time the rank of universal validity.
Theories of the State, like other juristic and political the-
ories, usually find their raison d'etre in the need to justify
a specific type of State-normally that under which the par-
ticular theorist happens to live. Changes in the form of the
State lead to changes in the views of the theorists. Thus,
the rise of the authoritarian State has been accompanied by
theories seeking to explain the new kind of State. Vigorous
defenses of the new Leviathan (usually by those living in
1 Laski, The Crisis in the Theory of the State in 2 LAw: A CENTURY OF PRoG-
RESS 1 (1937).
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the authoritarian State) have been met by equally vigorous
attacks (by those seeking to stop its expansion) and, as
always, both are phrased in terms of eternally valid theories
of the State.
If the advocates of the authoritarian State can be said to
be the spiritual descendants of Thomas Hobbes, its attackers
are in the spiritual line of John Locke, the exponent of the
theory of the Liberal State, which has held sway in the
Anglo-American world since 1688, although its bases have
been sorely shaken by events of the present century.
Under Locke's theory, substantial limitations are placed
upon the authority of the sovereign. In the first place, he
denies the existence of arbitrary power over the lives and
fortunes of the citizenry. Such authority as the sovereign
has, "in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good
of the society. It is a power that hath no other end but
preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy,
enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects." 2 Sec-
ondly, the supreme authority in the State "cannot assume
to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees,
but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the
subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorised
judges." '
There is here a basic difference with the Hobbesian
view. Leviathan was conceived of as possessing absolute,
arbitrary power--subject to no law. "For having power to
make, and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth, free him-
self from that subjection, by repealing those laws that trouble
him, and making of new; and consequently he was free be-
fore." " The idea of auto-limitations upon the sovereign,
which has appeared in recent continental thought, would be
wholly foreign to Hobbes. "For he is free, that can be free
2 LocxE, OF CivL GOVERNI!NT 67 (Gough ed. 1946).
3 Id. at 68.
4 HoBBEs, LEnATHAN 173 (Oakeshott ed. 1946).
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when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound
to himself; because he that can bind, can release; and there-
fore he that is bound to himself only, is not bound." 6
In Locke, on the other hand, there is the classic expres-
sion of the Anglo-American doctrine of the rule or suprem-
acy of law-of law as a check upon arbitrary power. The
sovereign is not to rule as he wills; he is "to govern by pro-
mulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite
at court and the countryman at plough." 6
There is another vital distinction between Leviathan and
the Liberal State. According to Hobbes, sovereignty is in-
divisible; the legislative, executive, and judicial power are
concentrated in the sovereign. Locke, like Montesquieu,
posits a separation of powers between the legislative and
executive branches. And, in a passage that has had great
influence upon American constitutional theory, he states the
doctrine against the delegation of legislative power: "The
legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any
other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the
people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others." 7 In
Leviathan, there is absolute, concentrated sovereignty. In
the Liberal State, power is limited and dispersed.
Hobbes and Locke thus differ fundamentally in their the-
ories of the State. To the Hobbesian concept of the State
as absolute power, Locke and most subsequent Anglo-Amer-
ican jurists oppose that of the State subject to law. This idea
of law as a check upon arbitrary governmental power is as
old as political theory itself. "He who bids the law rule,"
said Aristotle, "bids God and reason rule, but he who bids
man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a beast,
and passion perverts rulers, even though they be the best of
men. Therefore the law is reason free from desire." 
8
5 Ibid.
6 Locx, op. cit. supra note 2, at 71.
7 Ibid.
8 PoLiTics 3.16, 1287 a 29.
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Yet, inherent in the very idea of law is an antinomy which
causes the struggle for its attainment to be an endless one.
A system of law in its purest form is an unreachable ideal.
Instead, we see a continual progression between law and
power-between government by law and government with-
out law.
"Power and law, in their pure form, are antagonistic poles.
The one pole represents the idea of arbitrary might, un-
restrained by any rules of conduct. The other pole represents
the idea of a social system in which power is limited by a
maximum of effective checks and guaranties."'  Neither
is, by itself, wholly able to provide the means of social con-
trol. Hence, history has seen a constant shifting between
the two, as man has sought to find the optimum balance be-
tween these conflicting but necessary elements.
The law-power dichotomy has been of fundamental im-
portance in all theories of the State. Of no less significance
have been the theorist's ideas on the nature of law. Often
this depends upon the background of the particular theorist.
The lawyer naturally tends to take the analytical approach;
he sees the law as a body of rules binding upon those who
come within its jurisdiction. The philosopher tends to em-
phasize the end of law; he is interested, not so much in the
law as a logical system of commands, as in the promotion of
justice as its underlying purpose. He sees the law in the
light of its relation to a superior ethical system to which it
should conform. The historian sees the law as an expression
of the "Volksgeist"; the important thing to him is the par-
ticular "spirit" of the people, of which law is but the mani-
festation.
There is a close relation between the theorist's notions on
the nature of law and his theory of the State. The concept
of law as command leads to a magnification of the power of
the State as the source of the command. Likewise, the his-
9 BoDENnEirmR, JuRms xRuDEncE 28 (1940).
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torical approach often results in the over-glorification of the
State as the culmination of the Volksgeist. One who be-
lieves in principles of justice anterior and superior to law,
on the other hand, cannot logically put forward an absolutist
theory of the State. In his theory, the authority of the State
cannot be conceived of as unlimited; for, almost by defini-
tion, as it were, there are principles of right and justice above
and beyond even the power of the State.
Imperative theories of law, as has been stated, lead nat-
urally to absolutist theories of the State. Law is conceived
of as a command enforced by some coercive power. The
State is taken as the source of both the command and the
coercion. The supremacy of the State follows almost auto-
matically from this. The role of other social and economic
institutions, as competing power-structures, tends to be min-
imized. The State as the foun!tainhead of law is seen as
the all-dominant factor in society.
This result is facilitated by a rigid divorce of jurispru-
dence from all ethical elements. "The science of jurispru-
dence ... is concerned with positive laws, or with laws strict-
ly so called, as considered without regard to their goodness
or badness." 10 Starting with this sharp separation between
law and concepts of justice, it is difficult to think of the
State as subject to any limitations except self-limitations.
The State is the source of all law, which is valid by definition,
without regard to any ethical considerations. Hence, the
authority of the State must be conceived of as unlimited, in
a juristic sense. To speak of principles above and beyond
the power of the State would involve a contradiction in
terms.
The classical expression of the imperative theory of law
in the Anglo-American world is, of course, that of John Aus-
tin. According to his doctrine, positive law (with which
alone he is concerned) is "a command which obliges a per-
10 1 AusTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 176 (4th ed. 1873).
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son or persons"; the imperative element in law is thus con-
sidered as its most significant feature. The source of com-
mand in Austin's theory is the sovereign. "Every positive
law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a
sovereign person, or a sovereign body of persons, to a mem-
ber or members of the independent political society wherein
that person or body is sovereign or supreme." "
"It is one of the characteristics of Austin's doctrine that
it has no legal concept of the state." 12 Yet, he approaches
a theory of the State in his notion of sovereignty and of the
sovereign as the source of all law. In his writings, Austin
talks not of a State, but of the "independent political society"
which sovereignty implies. "If a determinate human su-
perior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior; receive
habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that de-
terminate superior is sovereign in that society, and the so-
ciety (including the superior) is a society political and in-
dependent." 13
From this point, it is not far to a theory of the State sim-
ilar to that of Hobbes, though perhaps not as baldly stated.
The basic principle of sovereign power is that it is incapable
of legal limitation; "every political society must have a sov-
ereign (one or a number) freed from legal restraints." "
The sovereign is thus subject to no law and there can be no
rights or principles above and beyond the power of the
State. This is true even of a law purporting to limit the sov-
ereign; "such a law is merely a law by metaphor, being only
a principle assumed for the guidance of his own conduct." 15
This is carried to its analytical extreme even in so far as po-
litical or civil liberty, which "has been erected into an idol,
and extolled with extravagant praises by doting and fanatical
11 Id. at 225.
12 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HAtv.
L. REv. 44, 63 (1941).
13 AusnN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 226.
14 1 AusTi, LEcTuREs o JuRsPRuDEN E 150 (Student's ed., Campbell,
1875).
15 Jd. at 151.
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worshipers," 16 is concerned. ". . . political or civil liberty
... is left or granted by a sovereign government to any of
its own subjects; and... since the power of the government
is incapable of legal limitation, the government is legally free
to abridge their political liberty, at its own pleasure or dis-
cretion." 17
The essence of sovereignty is thus the possession of the
suprema potestas-the sovereign is endowed with uncon-
trolled law-making power. This is but a restatement of
Leviathan or, going further back, of Bodin, who laid the
basis for traditional notions on sovereignty in his assertion
that: "All the characteristics of sovereignty are contained
in this, to have power to give laws to each and every .one of
his subjects, and to receive none from them." 18
Austin's analytical jurisprudence, though largely un-
noticed during his lifetime, has had a wide influence since
his death. Its attractiveness, especially for lawyers, is shown
by the many adherents of the analytical method, especially
in our own day. Foremost among contemporary Austinians
(although he was unaware of Austin's teaching until after
his system had been elaborated) is Hans Kelsen, the foun-
der of the so-called "pure theory of law." It is true that
there are many important differences between Austin and
the "pure theory of law." Yet, as Kelsen himself has
pointed out, the latter's orientation: 19
... is much the same as that of so-called analytical jurispru-
dence, which found its classical Anglo-American presentation
in the work of John Austin. Each seeks to attain its results
exclusively by analysis of positive law. While the pure the-
ory of law arose independently of Austin's famous Lectures
on General Jurisprudence, it corresponds in important points
with Austin's doctrine.
16 Id. at 159.
17 Ibid.
18 See Book 1, Chapter 8 of Boom, Dx LA REPuBLQux (1576).
19 Kelsen, supra note 12, at 54.
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Indeed, it can be claimed that Kelsen's work is but the logi-
cal culmination of the Austinian method. "It is submitted
that where they differ the pure theory of law has carried
out the method of analytical jurisprudence more consistently
than Austin and his followers have succeeded in doing." 2 0
One of the gaps in Austin which Kelsen has sought to fill
is the lack of a conscious theory of the State. Kelsen has
developed an elaborate Staatslekre, which has exerted great
influence during the present century. To understand his
theory of the State one should, however, first go briefly into
his ideas on the nature of law; for, in his theory, State and
law are declared to be identical.
Kelsen, like Austin, seeks to follow a method of pure logi-
cal analysis. "His is a purely logical method. He seeks to
find by formal logic conceptions which are to yield pure
norms-models or patterns of the threats addressed by those
who wield the authority of politically organized society to
those subject to its authority." 21 His theory is directed at
a structural analysis of positive law, strictly speaking.
"When this doctrine is called the 'pure theory of law,' it is
meant that it is being kept free from all the elements foreign
to the specific method of a science whose only purpose is
the cognition of law, not its formulation." 22 There is thus,
as in Austin, a rigid separation between law, on the one
hand, and politics and morals, on the other. Kelsen's sole
purpose is analysis of positive law. He "answers the ques-
tion of what the law is, not what it ought to be." 23
Kelsen, like the English analytical jurists, sees in the im-
perative element of law its most significant feature. He,
too, "regards the element of coercion as an essential charac-
teristic of the law." 24 To Kelsen, however, the Austinian
20 Ibid.
21 Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 51 HARv. L. Rav. 444, 449 (1938).
22 KaLsE, GFNERA THEORY or LAw AND STATE xiv (Wedberg's trans. 1945).
23 Kelsen, supra note 12, at 44.
24 Id. at 57.
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view that law is a command is true only in a figurative sense,
for the idea of command introduces a psychological element,
foreign to the "pure theory of law." "The statement that a
command exists means that a psychic phenomenon-a will
-is directed toward certain human behavior." 25  Law is
not a command, but a norm which describes what ought to
happen under certain circumstances. "We must clearly dis-
tinguish between the willing or thinking of the norm and the
norm itself which is willed or thought." 26 At the same
time, in defining law as norm, we have sharply delimited law
from nature. "The principle according to which natural
science describes its object is causality; the principle accord-
ing to which the science of law describes its object is norm-
ativity." 27 Law, in Kelsen's theory, can thus be termed a
"de-psychologized command." As Kelsen states: 28
This appears in the statement that man "ought" to conduct
himself according to the law. Herein lies the importance of
the concept of "ought," here is revealed the necessity for the
concept of the norm. A norm is a rule stating that an individ-
ual ought to behave'in a certain way, but not asserting that
such behavior is the actual will of anyone.
For Kelsen, then, the legal norm does not constitute a com-
mand, but a relation of condition and sequence. "If A is
done, B ought to happen." 29 The legal order is seen as a
graduated system of such legal norms. This order receives
its unity from the fact that all the norms of which a par-
ticular legal system is composed derive their validity from a
"basic" or "fundamental" norm (Grundnorin). "This basic
norm constitutes, as a common source, the bond between all
the different norms of which an order consists." 30
Viewing the legal order, as Kelsen does, from what he calls
the dynamic point of view, it does not appear "as a system
25 Id. at 56.
26 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 474, 479 (1934).
27 KEzsm, op. cit. supra note 22, at 46.
28 Kelsen, supra note 12, at 56.
29 FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 101 (1944).
30 KELSEX, Op. cit. supra note 22, at 111.
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of norms of equal rank, standing one beside the other, but
rather as a hierarchy in which the norms of the constitution
form the topmost stratum." "1 His hierarchical structure of
norms gives cohesiveness to the legal order: 32
The unity of these norms is constituted by the fact that the
creation of one norm-the lower one-is determined by an-
other-the higher-the creation of which is determined by a
still higher norm, and that this regressus is terminated by a
highest, the basic norm which, being the supreme reason of
validity of the whole legal order, constitutes its unity.
In Kelsen's theory, the basic norm upon which the legal
order rests must be assumed as an "initial hypothesis." "That
Parliament is sovereign in England is a fundamental norm,
no more logically deducible than that the command of the
Fiihrer is the supreme legal authority in Nazi-Germany
or that native tribes obey a witch doctor." 11 Kelsen does
not attempt to answer the question: What is the reason for
the validity of the grundnorm?; for it can be answered only
by reference to extra-legal factors, foreign to his "pure the-
ory of law." He does, however, state that "The question of
which is the basic norm responsible for the unity of a na-
tional legal order can be answered only in connection with
the relation in which national law stands to international.
And this question presupposes a clear insight into the rela-
tion of law and state." 34
Kelsen's theory of the State seeks to eliminate the tradi-
tional dualism between law and the State. "In the traditional
distinction between public and private law there emerges
clearly that powerful dualism which dominates modern legal
science, the dualism of state and law. Traditional legal the-
ory regards the State as something essentially different from
the law." " This is true to some extent even of Austin, for
31 Kelsen, supra note 12, at 62.
32 Kxsmi, op. cit. supra note 22, at 124.
33 FRmnwnx, LEGAL THEORY 102 (1944).
34 Kelsen, supra note 12, at 63.
35 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 51 L. Q. REv. 517, 533 (1935).
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his concept of the law as command presupposes the idea of
a separate entity-the State-as the source of command.
Kelsen rejects this dualism; he proudly proclaims that
"the pure theory of law is a monistic theory." 16 He argues
the identity of State and law, saying that the State is a
normative ordering coextensive with the normative ordering
of the system of law.3" "The Pure Theory of Law views
the State as a system of human behavior, an order of social
compulsion. This compulsive order is not different from the
legal order for the reason that within one community only
one and not two compulsive orders can be valid at the same
time." 38 State and law are identical concepts, for "a human
act is only designated an act of State by virtue of a legal
norm which qualifies it as such." 9 The State is conceived
of as a normative order, identical with the legal order; the
State is the sum total of compulsive norms and is thus co-
extensive with law. ".... if it be recognized that the state
is by its very nature an ordering of human behavior, that
the essential characteristic of this order, coercion, is at the
same time the essential element of the law, [the] traditional
dualism can no longer be maintained." 40
One must recognize that Kelsen's criticisms of traditional
dualistic theories are valid, to a large extent. Under dualistic
theory, the State is regarded as something essentially differ-
ent from the law, and yet, at the same time, is conceived of
as a legal thing. This position is achieved by regarding the
State as a person to whom is ascribed an existence independ-
ent of the legal order. This idea of the State as a separate
juristic person has often led to theories which magnify the
power of the State, as a super-being, not subject to legal con-
trol. The dualism posited between State and law all too
36 KIF E , op. cit. supra note 22, at xvi.
37 Pound, Law and the State-Jurisprudence and Politics, 57 Hm. L. REV.
1193, 1234 (1944).
38 Kelsen, supra note 35, at 534.
39 Ibid.
40 Kelsen, supra note 12, at 64.
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often leads to the complete dependence of the latter upon
the former. "Just as private law theory originally held it to
be true of the legal personality of the individual that it was
prior logically and in time to the objective law, so political
theory holds it to be true of the State that, as a collective
unity, as a being capable of willing and acting, it precedes
and is independent of the law." 41
Kelsen's theory eliminates this result. He states that: 42
When we have grasped... the unity of State and law, when
we have seen that the law, the positive law . . . is precisely
that compulsive order which is the State, we shall have ac-
quired a realistic, non-personificative, non-anthropomorphous
view, which will demonstrate dearly the impossibility of jus-
tifying the State by the law, just as it is impossible to justify
the law by the law.
Of especial value to the Anglo-American jurist is Kelsen's
strong attack upon the distinction between public and pri-
vate law, which, in most continental jurisprudence, is made
the basis of the systematization of law. "The Pure Theory
of Law, proceeding from its universalistic standpoint, envis-
aging always the unity of the law as expressed in the so-
called will of the State, perceives equally in the private legal
transaction and in the sovereign command an act of State,
that is, a law-making factor, implying a unified legal
order." 43
Some in the common law world have, it is true, felt that
our system has suffered for failing adequately to distinguish
between public law and private law. Thus, Dr. W. A. Rob-
son, testifying before the British Committee on Ministers'
Powers, bemoans "the absence of a body of public law and
the concepts appropriate thereto in English jurisprudence." 44
One can, however, assert that the absence of public law con-
cepts from Anglo-American jurisprudence, such as those ob-
41 Kelsen, supra note 35, at 534.
42 Id. at 535.
43 Id. at 533.
44 Co MMFITF ox MwismNS' Powms, MiNuTs Or EVIDENCE 52 (1932).
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taining in most continental countries-in the sense of a body
of law different from the ordinary private law, proceeding on
wholly different principles--is not to be deplored. The
notion that the administration of justice must be dualist in
character-that different rules are to be applied to State
action, that differing consequences are to follow where the
acts of government officials are involved, that such cases are
to be removed from the cognizance of the ordinary law
courts-these are wholly foreign to Anglo-American legal
philosophy. We have always rejected, both in our theory
and practice, the consequences flowing from these ideas-
that the official is to be placed upon a higher plane than the
individual, that immunity must be given to government
officials qua officials.
It has become the fashion of late on both sides of the
Atlantic strongly to criticize the work of A. V. Dicey, the
great Victorian constitutional lawyer; but he certainly saw
this point more clearly than most of his critics. With us, he
insisted, it must be the law courts which are to determine
questions of public law, and the applicable principles are
those that have been worked out by analogy from the ordi-
nary private law. This, indeed, is implicit in his third mean-
ing of the rule of law: that the British Constitution has been
derived from judicial decisions-that it is based upon legal
decisions, rather than that it is the result of a legislative act.
Dicey has stated that: 4'
[The] law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign
countries naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not
the source but the consequences of the rights of individuals, as
defined and enforced by the courts; .. . in short, the prin-
ciples of private law have with us by the action of the courts
and Parliament been so extended as to determine the position
of the Crown and of its servants.
This is the basic principle under which governmental power
is controlled in our polity. Dicey further says: 41
45 Dicmy, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 203 (9th ed. 1939).
46 Id. at 389.
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Any official who exceeds the authority given him by the
laws incurs the common law responsibility for his wrongful act;
he is amenable to the authority of the ordinary courts, and the
ordinary courts have themselves jurisdiction to determine
what is the extent of his legal power, and whether the orders
under which he has acted were legal and valid.
The absence of public law concepts, in the continental
sense, rather than being a defect of our jurisprudence, is
thus its great strength. It enables control over governmental
action to be maintained through the same institutions that
administer the normal law of the land, and on the same
basic principles of justice. It prevents the State from plac-
ing its own officials in a privileged position by refusing to
accept the assertion that different rules are to be applicable
to their action. Indeed, in so far as the common law courts
have not followed this principle consistently, in so far as
they have placed State action upon a higher plane of im-
munity, to that extent has our jurisprudence accepted the
continental theory. Thus, the privileged position of the
Crown as litigant in English law was characterized by a Lord
Chancellor's Committee as a "lacuna in the rule of law'; 47
-a condition which has only recently been remedied through
the passage of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. 41
Kelsen's attack upon the continental public-private law
dichotomy is hence of great value to the Anglo-American
jurist. His general theory of the State is, however, subject
to a fundamental criticism. By postulating the identity of
State and law, Kelsen does, it is true, eliminate the difficul-
ties which inhere in traditional dualistic theories of the
State. But his severe monistic approach leads to the confu-
sion of law with legality. If State and law are conceived
of as identical, it follows that everything done by the State
must acquire the stamp of legality. It matters not for Kel-
sen what may be the form of the particular State; "the law
47 REPORT Or THE Co mmTEE ON MmismRans' Powms, Cmm. No. 4060 at 112
(1932).
48 10 & 11 Gao. 6, c. 44.
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of the Soviet Republic should be considered every bit as
much a legal order as that of Fascist Italy or that of demo-
cratic, capitalist France." 19
Law in the common law sense must clearly be distinguish-
ed from legality, in the juridical sense. It has been observed
that: '0
It is not enough to say with Dicey that "Englishmen are
ruled by the law and by the law alone," or, in other words,
that the powers of the Crown and its servants are derived from
the law; for that is true even of the most despotic State. The
powers of Louis XIV, of Napoleon I, of Herr Hitler, and of
Signor Mussolini are derived from the law, even if that law
be only "The Leader may do and order what he pleases."
This distinction between law and legality has too often
been lost sight of. Thus, W. Ivor Jennings, quoted above to
illustrate the distinction, has gone so far as to assert that
the concept of the rule of law is "meaningless," "' for there
is no opposition between law and governmental power. "In-
deed, if the Stuart kings had substantiated their claims to
legislate and tax without the consent of Parliament and to
suspend and dispense with laws, these powers would still
be recognized by 'regular law.' " The rule of law is thus
relegated to the position of a "principle of political action,
not a purely juridical principle." 53
The same confusion is apparent in the ideas of recent
American theorists-exponents of the "realist" school of jur-
isprudence. Law, according to their views, is "what officials
do," or "whatever is done officially." 11 "This doing of
something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is the
business of the law. And the people who have the doing of it
in charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or
49 Kelsen, supra note 26, at 486.
50 JENNNGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 46 (3d ed. 1946).
51 Holdsworth, Book Review, 55 L. Q. REv. 585, 586 (1939).
52 JENNINGs, op. cit. supra note $0, at 287.
53 Id. at 288.
54, Pound, Fifty Yeors of Jurisprudence, 51 HARV. L. REv. 777, 800 n. 74
(1938).
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jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. What these offi-
cials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself." "
But this, too, ignores the difference between law and State
power. "It is not, as we used to think under the influence
of the common-law doctrine of the supremacy of law, that
things may be done officially according to law or without
law or against law, with appropriate legal remedy in the last
two cases. What is done officially is the law itself." 16
It is only in the "realist" sense, that whatever is done
officially constitutes law, that Kelsen's view that State and
law are identical can be maintained. One must assume, in
his theory, that every exercise of State power, by its very
nature, creates law. "The logical consequence of Kelsen's
theory is that every act of State domination is at the same
time a display of law and that every act in any way related
to law is an act of the State." 57
Looked at in this way, however, Kelsen's theory ignores
much which a theory of the State should consider. As Pro-
fessor Laski has pointed out: "Granted its postulates, I be-
lieve the pure theory of law to be unanswerable; but I be-
lieve also that its substance is an exercise in logic and not
in life. . . ." 58 If State and law are considered identical,
much of Western political theory loses all meaning. It has
been pointed out that: 19
If State and law are the same thing looked at from different
points of view, then the historical struggle of European nations
to endow their political life with the principle of legality lacked
meaning and sense. For, according to the theory discussed,
there is no fundamental difference between the rule of the
Stuarts and parliamentary government in modern England: ty-
rants acted as representatives of law in just the same manner
as did righteous rulers, for whom justice was the supreme
ideal. Every State, as such, is justified from the viewpoint of
law.
55 LLEWELLYN, TnE BRAMBLE BusHr 3 (1930).
56 POUND, ADMnsSTRATIVE LAW 18 (1942).
57 TMASHEir, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOoY OF LAW 213 (1939).
58 Laski, supra note 1, at 7.
59 TimAsnEs', op. cit. supra note 57, at 216.
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Under Kelsen's theory, concepts such as the rule of law
or government of laws become wholly shorn of meaning.
"Efiery State," says Kelsen, "is a government of laws," "
for State and law are synonymous concepts. Thus, though
Kelsen eliminates the dependence of law upon State, which
often follows from a dualistic approach, he reaches a similar
result through his monistic method. If State and law are
identical, it is obvious that State power is subject to no legal
restraints. Anything done by the State, no matter how
arbitrary or oppressive, is clothed with legal validity.
Every act of administration becomes, in Kelsen's theory,
ipso facto, an act of law. But this does away with the basis
for legal control over administrative action, which is so im-
portant in common law constitutional theory. If administra-
tion is necessarily law, it follows that the distinction be-
tween judicial and administrative acts is a relative one, and
that the judge should not logically be vested with a super-
visory power over administrative action. This has in fact
been carried into practice in the authoritarian State, where
there has been an increasing assimilation of administrative
and judicial functions. Both judges and administrators, in
totalitarian theory, take their orders from superior officials.
The Soviet jurist Paschukanis can argue "that in socialist
states all law becomes a matter of administration for the
benefit of the public." 61 Kelsen's theory of the identity of
State and law is thus hand-tailored to the needs of the auth-
oritarian State; for it is "an excellent instrument to be used
by a tyrant in order to justify his despotic regime as an
'order of law.' " 62
One should recognize that Kelsen has not been alone
among recent jurists in contesting the validity of the idea of
a distinction between domination of a legal and a despotic
type. Gustav Radbruch, for example, asserts that "Arbi-
60 Quoted in BODENHEIME, JURISPRUDENCE 284 (1940).
61 FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 106 (1944).
62 BODENHEImER, JURiSpRUDENCE 290 (1940).
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trary rule is not in contradiction to law. It is either unright-
eous law or illegal behavior." " This rejection of the dis-
tinction between arbitrary and legal action has, indeed,
been common on the continent and has, in large part, re-
sulted from imperative theories of the nature of law, prev-
alent in continental juristic thought since Jhering. If we
consider law merely as the command of the State, the auth-
oritarian State would be the law State par excellknoe."
Carried to their logical extreme, wholly imperative theories
of law vest the State with, as it were, God-like authority.
Ideas of justice and the end of law are excluded from legal
and political theory. Whatever is done by the State, which
in practice means by officials acting in the name of the State,
receives the almost mystical attributes connected with the
term law. The State, to quote Kelsen, is a "King Midas
in whose hands everything he touches is transformed into
law." 65
The distinction between law and administration, so funda-
mental in Anglo-American constitutional theory, is ignored,
for every act of administration is, practically by definition,
clothed at the same time with legal validity. Governmental
acts are, through the use of words of such wide secondary
significance as "law" and "sovereignty," impressed with ethi-
cal as well as legal authority. Laski has said that: 6
What the State wills has therefore moral preeminence. What
the State ordains begins to possess for you a special moral
sanction superior in authority to the claim of group or in-
dividual. You must surrender your personality before its de-
mands. You must fuse your will into its own. It is, may we
not without paradox say, right whether it be right or wrong.
The concept of law as command has thus had within it
the seeds of a revived absolutism as exemplified in the auth-
oritarian State.
63 Quoted in TEmAsr, loc. cit. supra note 57.
64 BODENUEEIER, JURISPRUDENCE Viii (1940).
65 KEwEN, ALLGEM:E=E STAATSLEHRE 242 (1925).
66 LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 78 (1917).
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It would be beyond the scope of this paper to attempt
to .construct a detailed Staatslehre in answer to imperative
theories of the State. It is, however, clear that they cannot
suffice for the Anglo-American jurist, who seeks to preserve
the common law principles upon which he has been nurtured.
At the same time, it has become painfully apparent that tra-
ditional theories of the Liberal State no longer serve to ex-
plain contemporary political developments. It has been
pointed out that: 17
The traditional theory of the state made it the effective
guardian of public order and gave to it the weapon of sover-
eignty that it might achieve its purposes. By sovereignty was
largely meant the right to act without being called to answer
for such policy as it might consider essential to its aims. It was
regarded as a person, with the significant limitation that the
possession of its rights did not involve, save as an act of
grace upon its own part, an assumption of proportionate legal
responsibility.
These traditional theories, framed when the State had
only the negative functions of war and justice, seem inade-
quate today when the Laissez-faire State is no more. Of
recent attempts to restate the theory of the State in other
than imperative terms, we can choose as the starting point
for our purposes that of LUon Duguit. He starts by reject-
ing the conception of sovereignty which lies at the base of
most theories of the State. "The State is not a power that
commands. The State is a differentiated society in which
the strongest must employ the force at their disposal to as-
sure the accomplishment of certain services for the benefit
of all. Those in power have therefore negative and positive
obligations." 68
Sovereignty is thus no longer valid as the central notion
in the theory of the State. Imperative doctrines of the State,
as Will-as will of the divinity (theocratic), as will of the
monarch (monarchic), or as will of the demos (democratic)
67 DUGurr, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE XV (Laski's trans. 1919).
68 Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 IHARv. L. REv. 1, 183 (1917).
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-no longer suffice as the basis of State power. The con-
cept of sovereignty is replaced by that of public service.
"So it is," says Duguit, "that the idea of public service re-
places the idea of sovereignty. The state is no longer a
sovereign power issuing its commands. It is a group of in-
dividuals who must use the force they possess to supply the
public need. The idea of public service lies at the very base
of the theory of the modern state." "
Once the functions of the State cease to be looked at in
the negative light of merely keeping the peace, it becomes
apparent that its raison d'etre lies in the social services it
performs. In them lies the basis of the allegiance owed the
State; to perform them, it has been given a monopoly of
power. Duguit observes that: 70
We recognize that the governing classes still retain power;
but they retain power today not by virtue of the rights they
possess but of the duties they must perform. The power there-
fore is limited by the degree in which those duties are ful-
filled. The functions they have to achieve form, in their
totality, the business of government.
The concept of public service as the basis of the modern
State is one which fits the changing conditions of today, for
its content is not conclusively defined. Thus it is said: 71
The content of public services is always varying and in a
state of flux. It is even difficult to define the general direction
of such change. All that can be said is that with the develop-
ment of civilisation the number of activities related to pub-
lic need grows and as a consequence the number of public
services grows also. That is logical enough. Indeed, civilisa-
tion itself is simply the growth of all kinds of needs that can
be satisfied in the least time. As a consequence, governmental
intervention becomes normally more frequent with the growth
of civilisation simply because government alone can make
civilisation a thing of meaning.
To carry out its public service functions, as we have seen,
the State has been given a monopoly of power. Yet it is
69 DUGUIT, op. cit. supra note 67, at xliv.
70 Id. at xli.
71 Id. at 44, quoting from an earlier work.
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precisely here that the great danger lies. As its public serv-
ice functions grow, the State tends more and more to become
the all-dominant factor in society. In the Negative or
Laissez-faire State, government was, after all, but one of
many competing power structures. The individual was
affected less by it than by those lesser institutions with which
he normally dealt. In the State toward which we are evolv-
ing, on the other hand, government tends gradually either
to take over or ,to control the functions heretofore performed
by these other institutions. As it does so, it comes into ever
increasing contact with, the individual life. "It is in this
ceaseless contact of the individual with the State that the
danger of arbitrariness has especially arisen." 72
Duguit advocates strong checks upon abuses of State
authority through the establishment of strict principles of
State responsibility. Emphasis is placed, not upon the power
of the State, but upon the duties of those who exercise such
power. "Those who in fact hold the power do not have a
subjective right of public power; but they are under the
obligation to employ their power to. organize public service,
to assure and to control its development. None of their acts
are of binding force or of political value, except when they
tend toward this end." " For the growth of those principles
of State responsibility which he advocates so strongly,
Duguit sees ample evidence in the doctrines of excis or de-
tournement de pouvoir as developed by the French Conseil
D'Etat.74 The keystone upon which control of the State
rests is the doctrine of ultra vires. Consequently, says
Duguit: 11
An objective act, whether done by the president of the Re-
public, or by the humblest official, may be attacked by any
citizen on the ground of ultra vires and the Council of State
will pass on its legality. The cost is a 60 centime stamp ...
72 DuGurr, M UEL DE DROIT CONsTiTUTIoNNEL 39 (1918).
73 Duguit, supra note 68, at 184.
74 FRrzmANN, LEGAL THEORY 159 (1944).
75 DuGurr, op. cit. supra note 67, at 172.
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The citizen is living under the regime of state and law and
where the government violates the law he has the right to de-
mand judicial censure.
The State itself is subject to law-which is inconsistent
both with traditional ideas of sovereignty and with Kelsen's
assertion of the identity of State and law. Duguit observes
that: "
Close analysis suggests that sovereignty and responsibilty
are mutually exclusive notions... [I]n the general acceptance,
irresponsibility implies a violation of law. That which creates
law by its sovereign will clearly cannot violate it. Just as in
an absolute monarchy the king can do no wrong, and is
therefore irresponsible, so the democratic state, which is no
more than the nation sovereignly organised, can do no wrong
and escapes responsibility.
State power is consequently a limited power. "Those
who govern have power only for the purpose of fulfilling
their obligations and only to the extent that they fulfill
them." 7 State power is limited by the concept of State
responsibility. Duguit's theory is thus diametrically opposed
to imperative ideas of State and law, which have led to
authoritarian theories of the State.
Bernard Schwartz
76 Id. at 199.
77 Duguit, supra note 68, at 183.
